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The advent of the Spanish Second Republic is bound irrevocably to 
the fall of the Dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (January 29, 
1930), a result of the downfall of those who had supported him from 
the outset. The figure of Alfonso XIII suddenly became the target of 
all opposition, besides those who were bitter at the dictator and his 
former friends. For a time, the king attempted to govern as Primo had, 
with a directory of ministers presided by General Dámaso Berenguer. 
Even so, closing the parenthesis of the Dictatorship would not suffice 
to save the throne since this collapse was the consequence of a process 
of decomposition of the Restoration system which had begun in 1909 
with the Tragic Week, gained momentum in 1917 with the 
Parliamentary Assembly movement and followed by the revolutionary 
strike of July-August 1918.By 1923, in the wake of that convulsion, 
Republican feeling had spread countrywide. Many army officers - 
including what was left of Primo’s Unión Patriótica - thought that the 
king had acted dishonestly in accepting the dictator’s resignation. The 
Berenguer government had to face up to a challenge from sectors of 
opinion that were already against the throne and, negotiating pitfalls, it 
tried to deploy its programme seeking to return to «constitutional 
normality». 
The Republican offensive unleashed in the spring of 1930 
took the form of peaceful propaganda, one of its watersheds being 
Alcalá Zamora’s speech in Valencia, running through to the summer 
of that year, when the different strands of Republicanism converged in 
the famous Pact of San Sebastian.1 This pact, uniting Republican, 
                                                 
1
 The attendees at the meeting in the Hotel de Londres in San Sebastian on 
August 17, 1930, reflect the forces that would support the first steps of the 
new regime to be born on April 14, 1931. In attendance were: «historic» 
republicanism (Alejandro Lerroux); the new Republican Left  (Manuel 
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Socialist and Catalan nationalist politicians and intellectuals, paved 
the way for the transition from monarchy to Republic.  It materialised 
in the form of an Executive Committee, whose first task was to 
prepare a revolutionary movement although, at the same time and at 
the instigation of Manuel Carrasco i Formiguera of Acció Catalana, it 
had to deal with the claims of Catalan nationalism. In the meantime, 
three eminent intellectuals, Dr Gregorio Marañón, the philosopher 
José Ortega y Gasset and the novelist Ramón Pérez Ayala, 
spearheaded the movement «At the service of the Republic» in 
Madrid.  
Moreover, other discontented elements were also seconding 
the anti-monarchic movement, including a healthy number of army 
officers who had come to sympathise with moderate opposition to the 
king. The prevailing mood in the final months of 1930 was one of 
great tension, given the subversive unrest, stoked by the more 
prestigious press and by the propaganda of military circles linked to 
the Unión Militar Republicana. An uprising was prepared for 
December. The sequence of events was rapid: the garrison of Jaca, in 
the foothills of the Pyrenees, led by Captain Fermín Galán and 
Lieutenant García Hernández staged an uprising, producing a 
manifesto of the Provisional government, before the attempt was put 
down. The two officers were imprisoned in Saragossa and shot as 
rebels and the signatories of the Pact of San Sebastian were arrested. 
However, in the wake of this military crisis, the support hitherto 
enjoyed by General Berenguer’s programme collapsed while the 
reputation of the incarcerated Republicans soared.  
 After an unsuccessful attempt at negotiating with the 
politicians and once Berenguer’s resignation had been accepted, the 
king appointed another military man, Admiral Aznar, as head of 
                                                                                                         
Azaña); moderate republicanism (Niceto Alcalá Zamora and Miguel Maura); 
the representatives of radical-socialism, Marcelino Domingo and Álvaro 
Albornoz; the Spanish Socialists Indalecio Prieto and Fernando de los Ríos; 
Galician regionalism (Casares Quiroga) and finally three figures from left-
wing Catalanism, Carrasco Formiguera (Acció Catalana), Maties Malliol 
(Acció Republicana de Catalunya) and Jaume Aiguader (Estat Català).  
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government. Aznar and the king decided to test public opinion and 
called municipal elections for April 1931. The elections were held in a 
buoyant atmosphere and were regarded as a plebiscite from the very 
outset. Political candidates held mass rallies all over the country. On 
April 12, when the final results were made known, it was immediately 
clear that in the major cities of Spain the candidates who supported the 
monarchy had been defeated. Although official figures returned 
29,953 monarchist councillors, as opposed to only 8,855 Republicans, 
the fact that Republican candidates had won in almost all the Spanish 
provincial capitals was decisive. This is how the great transformation 
occurred which extended to the the reformulation of the political and 
territorial organisation of the State; and, as had been agreed in San 
Sebastian, the constitution was obliged to afford some degree of 
autonomy to Catalonia.  
 
The Second Republic and the Statute of Autonomy of 
Catalonia  
 
The proclamation of the Catalan Republic, which shortly afterwards 
became the Generalitat de Catalunya (Vergés and Cruañas: 1991), 
heralded the beginning of a constituent period during which the legal 
structure of the new Catalan autonomy was to be built, under the 
political hegemony of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Ivern: 
1988, 1989), a new party led by Francesc Macià, a self-proclaimed 
left-wing nationalist. (Colomines: 2003) The other leading social and 
political powers in public life in Catalonia until the beginning of the 
Civil War were the conservative Lliga Regionalista, the Unió de 
Rabassaires, an agrarian trade union close to ERC, and CNT, the large 
anarchist trade union.  
A few hours before the Spanish Republic was proclaimed in 
Madrid, and shortly after it was proclaimed by Lluís Companys from 
the balcony of City Hall in Barcelona, Francesc Macià called for the 
establishment of a Catalan Republic. Three days later, on the 17th, 
three ministers of the provisional Madrid Government - Nicolau 
d’Olwer, Marcel·lí Domingo, both Catalans, and Fernando de los Ríos 
- travelled to Barcelona to negotiate an agreement that would make it 
possible to replace the Catalan Republic with the Generalitat de 
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Catalunya. They achieved their aim and also agreed to undertake the 
process of creating a statute of autonomy that was to be approved by 
the Spanish Constituent Assembly.  
In actual fact, Macià’s gesture had been ambiguous and 
provisional. He gradually abandoned the independentist tone evident 
in his words. Firstly, he proclaimed «The Catalan State which, with 
the utmost cordiality, we shall try to integrate within the Federation of 
Iberian Republics». Shortly afterwards he said: «On behalf of the 
people of Catalonia, I proclaim the Catalan State, under the regime of 
a Catalan Republic which, freely and in all cordiality, wishes and calls 
for the collaboration of the other peoples of Spain in the creation of a 
confederation of Iberian peoples». Finally, on the evening of the 14th, 
he wrote the definitive proclamation of «The Catalan Republic as a 
member State of the Iberian Federation».  
Moreover, from the very outset Macià was obliged to seek the 
support of Madrid in the appointments of new authorities to the 
position of Captain General, the civil government or judiciary power. 
Besides Spanish nationalists, most conspicuously represented by the 
Radical Republican Party and particularly by Emiliano Iglesias, the 
other important political forces in Catalonia did not support an 
independent Catalan Republic. Instead, they attacked the authority of 
Francesc Macià while negotiating with the new Republican authorities 
in Madrid. The other nationalist party, the Lliga Regionalista, placed 
the greatest emphasis on defending the rights of Catalonia «in the 
Spanish State, in perfect harmony with all the elements of which it is 
comprised ».  
The Catalan State proclaimed by Macià on a very strict 
interpretation of the Pact of San Sebastian which had led to the 
Republic, became the Generalitat de Catalunya, an autonomous 
political entity entrusted with drawing up a preliminary project for a 
statute of autonomy that was to be approved by plebiscite by the 
people of Catalonia and ratified by the future Spanish constituent 
assembly. The provisional government of the Generalitat elected, via 
town and city councils, a regional assembly formed by members of the 
Catalan Republican-Socialist coalition and former leaders of the 
nationalist Republican party. This assembly appointed a drafting 
board, which completed the preliminary version of the statute of 
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autonomy at the sanctuary of Núria on June 20, 1931. (Cucurull: 
1976) 
After the government of the Republic and the Generalitat had 
negotiated several amendments, the citizens of Catalonia had to 
approve the project. The plebiscite had two phases. Firstly, the town 
and city councils were unanimous in their agreement; and the 
referendum of August 2, with a voter turnout of 75%, returned a 
favourable 99% response. Women, not entitled to vote at the time, 
collected 40,000 signatures of support for the Statute of Núria. On 
August 11, a decree issued by the Generalitat declared that the project 
was the official will of Catalonia and it was presented as such to the 
Spanish Parliament on the 18th by the president of the Spanish 
republic, Niceto Alcalá Zamora.  
The Statute of Núria advocated a federal structure for Spain, 
the creation of a common government for the Catalan Lands within 
the Spanish federation and the recognition of the Catalan language as 
the only official language of Catalonia. A clear distribution of powers 
was made between the Republic and the Generalitat: the latter would 
be responsible for internal legislation and for the implementation of 
education, municipal laws and the internal territorial division, civil 
and mortgage law, public works, charity, agricultural and livestock 
resources and public order. Moreover, the Generalitat had executive 
power in several matters of Spanish law, such as the collection of 
certain taxes. It comprised a Parliament, the presidency of the 
Generalitat and its council and a higher court of justice. To implement 
the new autonomous regime, the main resources envisaged were those 
of the former county councils: direct taxation and resources of the 
state in Catalonia that were not bound to central functions of power.  
However, the Spanish Constitution of December 10, 1931 
curbed the autonomist aspirations contained in the Statute of Núria as 
Spain rejected the federal formula. According to this constitution, the 
Statute of Núria was not a project that the Spanish Parliament had to 
ratify but rather a preliminary project to be modified in all its points 
(González Casanova: 1974, 719-744). Thus, this first act of 
autonomous assertion by Catalonia remained legally inconsequential. 
On May 6, 1932, the debate on the Statute of Catalonia began in 
Parliament almost one year after its approval by the citizens of 
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Catalonia. In an atmosphere of suspicion and overt hostility, the 
Republican members of Parliament transformed the initial project 
through a long bargaining process during which concessions were 
made to the most conservative and centralist groups. The skill of 
Alcalá Zamora and Manuel Azaña’s eloquence were not enough to 
win the Republicans over to the Statute, whereas the Socialists tried to 
make sure that Catalan autonomy would not hamper their policy of 
state. The failed coup d’état by General Sanjurjo (August 1932) 
against what he regarded as a dismemberment of Spain, momentarily 
united the Republican members of Parliament, and the Spanish 
Parliament approved a modified Statute of Catalonia on September 9.  
 
The institutionalization of autonomy  
 
The new Statute of Autonomy defined Catalonia as an autonomous 
region within the Spanish State and 
• made bilingualism official 
• reduced Catalan legislative power, as well as the 
implementation of several matters called for by the Statute of 
Núria 
• provided for the appointment of state delegates to supervise 
implementation by the Generalitat 
• rejected Catalonia’s exclusive powers in education 
• created a mixed security commission for public order 
• declared the right of unilateral intervention by central 
government  
• introduced other limitations on the autonomous regime, such 
as replacing an equal representation court to solve conflicts 
between the central government and the Catalan Generalitat 
by a court of constitutional guarantees of the Spanish State.  
(González Casanova: 1974, 706-754) 
 
In short, the rejection of the federalist Statute of Núria led clearly 
to regional dependence. Despite this downgrading of the statute, 
Catalan politicians at the time regarded it as a historic conquest and a 
re-establishment of Catalonia’s self-government. Theoretically, the 
statute paved the way for progressive legislation and for the re-
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emergence and development of Catalan culture. Nevertheless, it was 
always looked upon as being below the federal ideal and below full 
autonomy. In practice, other limitations were gradually to affect the 
Statute, such as the slow transfer of services,2 the declaration of 
unconstitutionality of the first major law of social reform (the Law of 
Contracts of Cultivation) and the partial suspension of the Statute 
between October 6, 1934 and the victory of the Popular Front in 
February 1936.  
The institutionalization of self-government in Catalonia was 
therefore represented by the Generalitat de Catalunya which 
comprised a Parliament, the President and the Executive Council or 
Government. As stated above, the Generalitat was recognized by the 
provisional government of the Republic on April 21, 1931, and 
relations between both institutions were determined by the decree of 
May 9, 1931. By its decree of April 28, 1931 the Generalitat 
established its constitution, provisional council, a regional assembly - 
known as the Provisional Regional Council of the Generalitat -, and 
commissioners from the provinces of Girona, Lleida and Tarragona, 
jointly approved the statute. Following the approval of the Statute of 
Catalonia (September 1932), which defined the functions of the 
Generalitat, the Domestic Statute was approved on May 26, 1933 by 
the Catalan Parliament. (González Casanova: 1974, 790-802) 
According to these texts, the Generalitat was formed by, in the first 
place, the President, who was elected by Parliament and who had a 
two-fold role as principal authority of Catalonia and representative of 
the central state in Catalonia. Thus, he had executive functions for 
which he was answerable to Parliament which could withdraw its 
confidence. The Generalitat also comprised the Parliament of 
Catalonia, elected by universal suffrage. Finally, it included the 
executive council of the Generalitat, comprised by the President and 
                                                 
2
 On November 21, 1932 a Mixed Commission of the Statute of Catalonia 
was established, with six voting members appointed by the Spanish 
government and six by the Generalitat, to make the inventory of the goods 
and the rights of the Spanish State which were transferred to the Generalitat, 
and to adapt the services that were ceded on to the latter. This commission 
lasted until 1939. 
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the ministers in charge of the autonomous ministries (known, as of 
1936, as Departments) of Justice, Law, Culture, Finance, Defence, 
Health and Social Assistance, Economy, Public Works, Agriculture, 
etc). 
Another autonomous organism was the Court of Appeal, 
comprising a president and twelve magistrates, and also there was the 
Council of Security of Catalonia which dealt with for matters of 
public order and co-ordinated the action of the Spanish State and the 
Generalitat. While the cost of the transfer of services from the State to 
the Generalitat was being studied, the latter’s resources were limited 
to 73 million pesetas (collected through the transfer of certain 
contributions and share in the State’s reserve from taxation), whereas 
the cost of the services transferred totalled 83 million pesetas.  
Parliament was the legislative branch of the Generalitat de 
Catalunya. The first elections of members of Parliament - the only 
ones that were actually held, as the initial five-year term overlapped 
with the Civil War - took place on November 20, 1932. There were 85 
seats: 61 were won by Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, 16 by the 
Lliga Regionalista, 5 by Unió Socialista, 1 by Acció Catalana and 1 by 
Unió Democràtica. The most important aspect of this Parliament 
legislative function, greatly conditioned by its short-lived existence 
and the slow transfer of services, was the drafting of organic texts, 
particularly the Domestic Statute and the municipal law.  
The function of its political control was affected by the 
parliamentary majority of Esquerra Republicana, which supported the 
legislative initiative of the Executive Council of the Generalitat (94% 
of the 133 bills examined by Parliament were approved). The main 
issues addressed by Parliament pertained to local life, budgets and 
justice; and, although without legislative capacity, it tackled issues 
related to the transfer of services, labour and social affairs. It held a 
total of 259 sessions, the first on December 6, 1932, and the last on 
October 1, 1938. It had stopped meeting between October 1934 and 
February 1936 while the Statute had been unconstitutionally 
suspended. Moreover, only five sessions were held during the war. 
The structure, organization, and operation of Parliament were largely 
defined by the Constituent Assembly of the Spanish Republic, and 
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were similar to those of the contemporary parliaments of liberal 
democracies.  
 
The events of October 1934 and the outbreak of the Civil 
War  
 
The conservative about-turn of the Spanish electorate around 
November 1933, and the access to the central power by a right wing 
party hostile to Catalan autonomy, placed the left-wing government of 
the Generalitat in a difficult situation, opening up a latent conflict 
between both powers. At the same time, in Catalonia the working 
masses had given up their initial hopes in the new regime and the 
anarchists had made several attempts at insurrection at a time when 
the worldwide economic crisis was deepening. The passing of the Law 
of Contracts for Cultivation by the Parliament of Catalonia, which 
improved the lot of agricultural workers, triggered opposition from the 
right wing, headed by the Lliga Catalana (former Lliga Regionalista), 
and provoked a confrontation with the government of the Republic 
which resulted in the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees trying to 
curtail Catalonia’s autonomy.  
The crisis was further complicated by the strength that the 
Estat Català separatist sector had attained within Esquerra and by the 
pressure brought to bear on the Generalitat de Catalunya by the 
Aliança Obrera [Worker’s Alliance]. This conflict came to a head in 
the proclamation of a Catalan state made by President Companys on 
October 6, 1934. However, this institutional revolt must be seen as a 
step back in the objectives pursued thus far since Companys reneged 
on one of the outstanding precepts of his political work: the 
vertebration of the Catalan left into sovereign parties with a line of 
action based primarily on the Catalan political ethos. Moreover, the 
revolt of October 6 in Barcelona, coinciding with the socialist 
insurrection in Asturias, was primarily the result of pacts between  
parties of the Catalan and Spanish Left rather than any initiative 
inspired by Josep Dencàs and other home-grown Estat Català radicals, 
as is often asserted.  
In this way, Companys suffered the backlash of an 
irresponsible Spanish Left that had never reconciled itself with the 
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electoral victory of the Right. One finds oneself obliged to question 
exactly what could justify the revolt of the Government of the 
Generalitat precisely when power was in the hands of its own party, 
the ERC? The answer is clearly nothing, barring the agreements that 
the Catalan ministers Lluhí i Vallescà and Joan Comorera had reached 
with Azaña, Prieto and other left-wing leaders: agreements which 
president Companys honoured as if they were his own. The Catalan 
institutional revolt in 1934 was therefore the consequence of 
agreements made state-wide between politicians, and this is surely 
why the Catalan people en masse did not get involved as the adventure 
neither responded to the situation objectively nor served any 
immediate social needs.  
Nevertheless, the heavy-handed repression following the 
attempted coup, the suspension of the Statute of Autonomy and the 
implementation of  what can only be termed a caricature of autonomy 
governed by the right wing facilitated a rapprochement between 
Republican and proletarian left-wing parties, giving rise to the victory 
of the Front d’Esquerres de Catalunya [Catalan Popular Front] in 
February 1936. Catalan institutions were re-established and the path of 
bourgeois reform undertaken anew, leading to a short-lived period of 
social and political peace (what has been referred to as the «oasis of 
Catalonia»), which was jolted from its idyll by the military uprising of 
July 19th and the start of the Civil War.  
However, in Catalonia, the military uprising and the 
revolutionary response sparked radical changes in the power relations 
between the central administration and autonomous government. The 
first consequence of the new state of affairs was that the Generalitat 
overstepped the framework of the Statute of Autonomy since it took 
on a series of functions which, according to the Statute and the 
Constitution, were exclusively state powers. The new revolutionary 
climate, as Rafael Tasis wrote in 1937, «has given Catalonia a breadth 
of powers which outstrip the strict limits of the autonomy established 
by the Statute of 1932. It has been afforded functions and sovereignty 
of the State in many matters, such as national defence, hitherto outside 
its sphere of jurisdiction. The far-reaching economic and social 
transformation of the country is being accompanied by a re-structuring 
of state functions, imposed by changing circumstances from one 
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moment to the next. The Generalitat has had to take charge of state 
services, which must be attended to directly» (Tasis Marca: 1937, 23). 
Josep Tarradellas, one of the strong men of ERC, was of the same 
opinion. However, he made it clear that the aim was not separation 
from Spain:  
Once again Catalonia has given support to its freedoms which 
for us are not established by a Statute or a Constitution [...], but 
together with this sincere and loyal attitude, I am sure that Catalonia 
would also like its political and social ideals to spread throughout 
Spain so that, on the day of victory, we may all come together in that 
broad and humane federal Republic which Catalans have always 
longed for (Tarradellas: 1937). 
This new legal framework was arranged around three major 
concepts: a) defence against the enemy without and maintenance of 
public order within; b) structuring of a new economy and c) to make 
the Generalitat the only political power in Catalonia. On July 19, it 
was evident that the CNT had become the most important force in 
Catalonia although the police forces of the Generalitat, headed by 
Escofet, Guarner and Vidal i Jover, participated actively in the 
defence of the Republic. Also clear was the fact that the Civil Guard 
had been won over to legality by the Minister of Governance, Josep 
M. España.  
It should thus come as no surprise that the CNT had to address 
the dilemma, as its leader Joan García Oliver later acknowledged, of 
implementing «libertarian communism, which is the same as anarchist 
dictatorship; or democracy, which means collaboration» (García 
Oliver: 1978). This was the scenario in which the interview between 
President Companys and a delegation of the CNT was held on July 20, 
1936, at which time it was agreed that Companys would continue to 
be the President of the Generalitat in exchange for the creation of the 
Central Committee of Antifascist Militia (CCMA), which would 
oversee in the creation of fighting columns and rearguard patrols and 
would also take charge of provisioning (Peirats: 1971). Thus, the 
CCMA was set up on July 21 with the participation of three 
representatives from ERC, one from the UR, three from the CNT, two 
from the FAI, one from Acció Catalana Republicana, three from the 
UGT, one from the POUM and another from the PSUC, after this 
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party was constituted on the 22nd of that month. This duality of power 
remained more or less in place until the end of 1936, and in certain 
regards until the events of May 1937. However, what is most 
significant is that the limits of the Statute were overstepped with the 
CCMA, as can be seen in the legislation pertaining to defence and 
public order,3 the Generalitat’s intervention in the Bank of Spain in 
Barcelona (August 27), the creation of the War Industries Commission 
on August 7, and four days later at the instigation of the CNT, of the 
Council of Economy of Catalonia, whose role was to coordinate the 
collectivised economy.  
It was this organism that produced the Socialist Plan for 
Transformation of the Country,4 which was accepted by the new 
                                                 
3
 Decree of the Presidency of the Generalitat of July 21, 1936, which created 
the Citizens’ Militia of Catalonia; decree of the government of the Republic 
of August 17, 1936, which transferred services which, according to article 8 
of the Statute were reserved to the State: border policy, immigration, 
emigration, foreign citizens, system of extradition and expulsion and other 
security-specific matters, regardless of whether they were extraregional or 
supraregional; the creation, on September 27, 1936, of the Domestic Safety 
Board recognizing the control patrols as elements of public order, besides 
stipulating that every citizen of military age was to possess an ID card. 
Similarly, on September 29, a Technical Section or General Staff was created 
to coordinate the front, and which reported to the Department of Defence, 
albeit subordinated to the Standing Council of War, with the participation of 
Sandino, Tarradellas, Fàbregas, Comorera and Nin. By virtue of the decree of 
October 21, 1936, of the presidency of the Government of the Republic, all 
public services were transferred «even suppressing, insofar as may be 
necessary, the action of the State during the present circumstances». By 
virtue of the decree of the Generalitat of November 21, 1936, when the 
Nationalists attacked Madrid, the army of Catalonia was created.   
4
 The Socialist Plan for Transformation of the Country established: 1) 
Production was adjusted to suit the needs of consumption; 2) Monopoly of 
foreign trade; 3) Collectivization of the major agrarian properties and 
obligatory trade union membership of rural workers; 4) Partial devaluation of 
urban property by means of taxes and rent reductions; 5) Collectivization of 
the major industries, public services and community transport; 6) 
Confiscation and collectivization of abandoned companies; 7) Extension of 
the cooperative system of products; 8) Open trade union control in private 
companies; 9) Open control in banking operations until banking 
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popular unity government of the Generalitat on September 26, 1936. 
Moreover, on October 15 the Board of Foreign Trade of Catalonia was 
created, making it possible to open a branch of the Office of Foreign 
Trade of the Generalitat in Geneva on the 22nd of that month, and to 
establish the countermark of Catalonia. The economic policy of the 
Generalitat was defined in the so-called decrees of s’Agaró and the 
Tarradellas Plan of January 8, 9 and 12 of 1937. This Plan contained 
58 provisions, which implemented a municipal, banking and credit 
redistribution, set up a taxation system for Catalonia and created 
several savings banks. (Arias Velasco: 1977, 225-226)  
It is very important to note that the Generalitat awarded itself 
powers to legislate on workers’ conquests until it was possible to 
render what José A. González Casanova called «legal sovereignty» 
compatible with the «real sovereignty» imposed by the popular 
revolution. (1974: 410)  This obvious from the decree of August 28, 
1936, signed by Lluís Companys, which stated:  
 
At this moment in time, the work of government must ensure a unity of 
thought that encompasses the economic and social feelings of the 
proletariat of Catalonia. Thus, at the proposal of the President of the 
Government, and in agreement with the Council,  
»I Decree:  
»Only the legal provisions published in the Diari Oficial de la 
Generalitat de Catalunya [Official Gazette of the Autonomous 
Government of Catalonia] will be enforceable in the territory of 
Catalonia.»  
 
This decree was extended through the order of September 4, 1936, 
repealing the order of July 29, 1935, which had entrusted the 
departments of the Generalitat with the publication of laws and 
regulations dictated by the government of the Republic. Therefore, 
with these provisions, the Generalitat became momentarily the sole 
                                                                                                         
nationalization was realized; 10) Rapid absorption of the unemployed and 11) 
Suppression of indirect taxes and the establishment of a single tax (Bricall: 
1970, 262).  
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government of Catalonia. However, it is also true that during the first 
few months of the war an unstable equilibrium prevailed in Catalonia 
between the CNT-FAI-POUM block on the one hand and the ERC-
ACR-PSUC group on the other. The instability was further 
compounded by the tension between the autonomous government and 
the government of the Republic.  
Relations between Catalan political forces were marked, at 
least between July and September 1936, by the clear predominance of 
the CNT which reigned in the streets, but also by the anarchist trade-
union’s decision to «institutionalise» their revolutionary conquests 
through the Generalitat. The CNT found an ally in President 
Companys who, in exchange for preserving formal authority, let them 
do as they wished. This alliance was prompted by the shared 
disappointment in the central government’s refusal to give credits to 
Catalonia to meet the needs caused by the war and the collectivisation 
of its industry. It was this sense of abuse by central government that 
lead the CNT, at the plenary meeting of its Catalan local and district 
federations held on September 24, 1936, to accept the organisation’s 
incorporation into the government of the Generalitat. This decision 
took place two months before the CNT agreed to enter the Madrid 
government presided by Largo Caballero. (Abad de Santillán: 1940) 
The intervention of Joan P. Fàbregas, the CNT delegate in the 
Ministry of Economy, denouncing the lack of economic aid to 
Catalonia from the Republican authorities, proved decisive in leading 
the anarchist trade unionist to abandon the CCMA and join the 
autonomous government. The truth is that the confrontation between 
Barcelona and Madrid became more heated as time went on. Azaña’s 
views, published at the end of the war, are a good example of this:  
 
The Generalidad’s actions are insurrectionist. While they say in private 
that issues of Catalanism have been relegated to second place, and that 
now nobody intends to take Catalanism to the extreme, the Generalidad is 
assaulting the State’s services and sequestering its functions, the ultimate 
aim being a de facto separation. It legislates where it has no power; it 
administers that which does not belong to it. In many of its assaults 
against the State it uses the FAI as its shield. It takes over the Bank of 
Spain to prevent the FAI from doing it. It takes over the customs, the 
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border police, the direction of the war in Catalonia, etc. Availing itself of 
the miserable pretext of preventing the trade unions from stripping the 
State, it complains that the State does not help it and it falls prisoner of 
the trade unions. The government of Catalonia exists in name only. The 
trade union representatives in the government mean little or nothing; their 
comrades do not obey the government and they do not keep the 
agreements laboriously reached in council. The decree for the 
collectivisation of industry was an act of political chicanery in exchange 
for trade union acceptance of the decrees of mobilisation and 
militarization. The decree was fulfilled but the others were not. When the 
Government of the Generalidad issued fifty-eight decrees at once, each 
one of them a legal transgression, none were observed because the trade 
unions did not like them. We thus enjoy the double gain of the 
Generalidad interfering in affairs that do not concern it and anarchic 
disobedience. The repercussions of the war are now visible. A rich, 
populous and hard-working country with industrial power is now gagged 
for military action. While others fight and die, Catalonia talks politics [...] 
Eight months into the war, Catalonia has failed to organise a useful force, 
after opposing the organisation and control of any such force by the 
Government of the Republic. Now, when everyone is crying out for an 
army, the advantages of having burnt the mobilisation records, of having 
made bonfires with equipment and saddles, of allowing the FAI to take 
over barracks and scare off recruits will be reaped. The newspapers, and 
even the men of the Generalidad, talk daily about the revolution and 
winning the war. They talk about the participation of Catalonia as a 
nation rather than a province. As a neutral nation. They talk of the war in 
Iberia. Iberia? What does that mean? A former country in the Caucasus? 
[...] since the war is being fought in Iberia, things can be taken calmly. At 
this rate, if we win, the State will end up owing money to Catalonia. 
Catalan affairs during the Republic, more than any others, have aroused 
the military’s hostility towards the regime. The pest of anarchy emerged 
from Catalonia during the war. Catalonia has detracted enormously from 
the resistance against the rebels and the military thrust of the Republic. 
(Azaña: 1939,101-104.)  
 
The complaints of the president of the Spanish Republic are harsh, as 
harsh as those that might be levelled by the Generalitat against the 
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government of the Republic. However, the fact is that the trade 
unionisation of Catalan politics is irrefutable; as is the antagonism 
between autonomous government and State for control of the situation 
in Catalonia.5  
In the first year of the war, then, the struggle for hegemony 
was intense, spawning a scenario of tension between State and 
Generalitat which was predicated on the differing strategies on war 
and revolution. The conflict came to a head, of course, in the outbreak 
of violence and unrest in May 1937.6 
 
 
                                                 
5
 There are many examples of this tension. For example, the discussion in 
September 1936 on the relocation of munitions manufacturing equipment 
from Toledo to Barcelona which did not take place and which eventually fell 
into the hands of the nationalist army. The demand by the first government of 
Largo Caballero for Catalan expeditionary troops in Majorca to withdraw 
from the island and return to Barcelona. The prohibition by the Council of 
Ministers on April 5, 1937 to send reserves of salt to Catalonia. The decree 
on militarization of March 1937 to disarm the workers militia. The creation, 
on April 29, 1937 of the Board of Regulation of Foreign Trade, reporting to 
the Ministry of Trade, which heralded the beginning of state intervention in 
the Catalan economy. The decree of May 4 by virtue of which the 
government of the Republic reassumed the functions of the department of 
Defence of the Generalitat and transferred them to the organic Division of 
Catalonia led by general Pozas 
6
 In Catalonia, the struggle for hegemony was very complex. The permanent 
rift between CNT-FAI-POUM and ERC-ACR-PSUC and the difficulties 
between the governments of Barcelona and Madrid went hand in hand. In the 
end, as has often been said, this rift mirrored the confrontation between two 
strategies. On the one hand, the strategy advocated by those in favour of the 
revolution which meant defending revolutionary conquests at any cost and, 
on the other, that of the moderates who wanted to focus on wining the war. 
The second strategy entailed increasing links with the State, particularly in 
the military aspect, without belittling the autonomous institutions. ERC 
maintained an ambiguous position, since it sought to consolidate autonomy 
without cutting itself off from the general interest but, at the same time, it 
was bound by the support it received from the CNT. (Peirats: 1971, 206; 
COMORERA: 1937)  
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The events of May 1937 and the decadence of autonomy  
 
Between September 1936 and May 1937, the tension between the 
State and the Generalitat increased substantially, as did the tensions 
among the Catalan political forces. The dilemma between war and 
revolution was becoming increasingly unbearable and was expressed 
in the discussion on whether or not there was a need for a unified 
army, an idea staunchly defended by the communists in the attempts 
to curb the revolution. It was evident that these contradictory 
strategies would lead Catalonia to a major internal confrontation, 
which is what actually happened in May 1937. (Bonamusa:1977; 
Cruells: 1970; Semprún-Maura: 1975) The bloody explosion at street-
level of the differences between the two strategies was resolved with 
the dissolution of the POUM and the persecution of its leaders, the 
subjection of the CNT and the predominance of the PCE-PSUC which 
led to the resignation of Prime Minister Largo Caballero and the 
establishment of the first Negrín government.  
The new government, based on the alliance between the 
Socialists Juan Negrín and Indalecio Prieto and the Communists, with 
the exclusion of trade union representatives, engaged in re-forging 
pre-war political alliances. As far as Catalonia was concerned, the new 
Republican government strove to limit - and even undermine - the 
revolutionary impetus, which the new government of the Generalitat, 
constituted on June 29, would deflate even further: 
 
At last the Popular Front — said the UGT. The new government of 
Catalonia, based on the Popular Front, has been formed in view of the 
demands of the CNT and is prepared to collaborate loyally with the 
Republic. To this end, the whole of Catalonia has shown its satisfaction 
with a government that is a true reflection of the spirit of the masses, 
[formed] in order to win the war and bring about the popular revolution. 
(Vertical, 30-VI-1937)7 
                                                 
7
 Ángel Pestaña, former anarchist trade unionist and leader of the Partit 
Sindicalista, made the following observation: «We have made our movement 
hated by sacrificing many liberal men who had fought, throughout their life, 
against reaction. Revolution, which can bring out what is most noble in man, 
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The slow but relentless backslide continued with the relocation of the 
government of the Republic from Valencia to Barcelona on October 
31, 1937.  
The PSUC, whose hegemony coincided with the CNT’s 
removal from the centres of power (Generalitat, government of 
Madrid and the dissolution of the Council of Aragon), advocated the 
further centralisation of the war economy while defending the 
autonomy of Catalonia on the basis of the legal statute of 1932. The 
result of this shift in the correlation of forces was the progressive 
recovery of state intervention in Catalan affairs. Besides the 
aforementioned decrees, through which the State had recovered the 
powers of defence and internal law and order, centralisation was 
consummated on May 20, 1937 with the reshuffle of Catalan military 
defence and the creation of the Army of the East, commanded by 
General Pozas. An order of the central government of July 24, 1937, 
which created a Mixed Government-Generalitat Commission to co-
ordinate legal reform, the creation of the Military Information Service 
(SIM), the dissolution of the War Industries Commission on January 
23, 1938, or the suppression, on January 6, 1938 of the Provisioning 
department of the Generalitat in favour of a National Supplies 
Commission, were some of the decisions taken by the government of 
the Republic to recover the ground it had lost in Catalonia in the early 
years of the war.  
Although the government of the Republic was initially 
welcome on its arrival in Barcelona, the relations between this 
institution and the Generalitat deteriorated very rapidly to the extent 
that, following the demise of Prieto, whom the Communists blamed 
for the fall of the city of Teruel and the advance of the Francoist army 
towards Catalonia, the new Negrín government encountered 
opposition from the Generalitat as well as the CNT. Nevertheless, 
President Companys, supported only by his party (ERC) and the 
PSUC, issued decree on June 16, 1938, repealing the decree of August 
28, 1936, which had established the full sovereignty of Catalonia. The 
                                                                                                         
also accentuates that which is most repugnant and cruel in us». (Hora 
sindicalista, 30-V-1937.) 
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Generalitat, once again, was an autonomous government bound by 
State guidelines, or at least the little that was left of it. The bitter taste 
of defeat in Catalonia was compounded by the impression that, for 
other Spaniards as Antoni Rovira i Virgili recalls, the only thing 
Catalans seemed to be good for was to be used as recruits:  
 
They are good for fighting, for dying, but not to give orders in the army 
or in the government of the Republic. They even lack the psychological 
mechanisms for a heroic and decisive Catalan reaction. «Catalans should 
be more involved in the defence of Catalonia», Comorera himself said, 
despite his unconditional support of the Negrín government. No 
important role is or will ever be given to Catalans, except being blamed 
for defeats and particularly for the final defeat, the blame which was 
reserved for us from the very beginning if the war was lost.  
What a paradox! When the war was led here by the men of the 
Generalitat they were criticised and accused by the governing bodies 
[secluded] in Madrid and later in Valencia and at a time when the Aragon 
front was almost routed, we had conquered three quarters of the region, 
had laid siege to Huesca, were but a cannon shot away from Saragossa, 
had sent an expedition to Majorca (fouled up by the central government) 
and had put together important forces to aid the capital of Spain. And 
when these self-same governing parties took over control of the war on a 
front maintained by Catalonia, then the front of Aragon collapsed, and we 
found the enemy breathing down the neck of Catalonia… (1999: 17-18) 
 
In the meantime, General Franco, who had already taken Lleida and 
had managed to isolate Catalonia from the rest of Republican territory, 
published the well-known decree abolishing the Statute of Autonomy 
on April 5, 1938, which came into effect on February 10, 1939, when 
Catalonia was totally occupied. And under Franco, once again the 
national representation of Catalonia had to become clandestine.  
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